amneziawg-installer: one-command VPN server that works where WireGuard gets blocked
(github.com)
from bivlked@lemmy.world to selfhosted@lemmy.world on 06 Apr 10:49
https://lemmy.world/post/45242153
from bivlked@lemmy.world to selfhosted@lemmy.world on 06 Apr 10:49
https://lemmy.world/post/45242153
WireGuard is blocked by DPI in 10+ countries now. AmneziaWG 2.0 is a fork that makes the traffic look like random noise - DPI can’t tell it apart from normal UDP. Same crypto under the hood, negligible speed overhead.
I wrote an installer that handles the whole setup in one command on a clean Ubuntu/Debian VPS - kernel module, firewall, hardening, client configs with QR codes. Pure bash, no dependencies, runs on any $3/month box. MIT license.
Been running it from Russia where stock WireGuard stopped working mid-2025.
threaded - newest
DPI?
Deep Packet Inspection
Wasn’t sure either, looked it up quickly…
In this context it’s probably referring to Deep Packet Inspection, some technique to determine traffic type, and then blocking specific (Wireguard and/or OVPN) traffic.
Deep packet inspection. Looking for patterns in the actual headers and payload of packets. Computationally expensive.
Thanks to all replyers. My brain came up with dots per inch, which didn’t make any sense at all.
It is not as expensive as it used to be.
Deep package insertion.
This baby’s built for deep penetration, not speed!
So, explain this to me. I hear people talk about blocked VPNs, and it’s true that some websites do block most, if not all, VPN. However, you mentioned Russia, and I use Wireguard, and I have no issues accessing Russian sites. I just visited government.ru. So, is the problem getting out of Russia, or getting in?
Sounds like the issue is ISPs within Russia blocking outgoing Wireguard traffic from customers.
If the traffic exits the tunnel without hitting a Russian ISP (e.g. a Mullvad exit node in Sweden that routes the unencrypted traffic to the destination), you won’t be affected. If the exit node is behind a Russian ISP, it might get filtered by DPI depending on which direction is subject to the filter.
Right, but if you have the ability to block wireguard coming out of Russia, wouldn’t it make sense to block Wireguard or any other VPN protocol into Russia? I mean, China is rather notorious for blocking VPN usage but citizens still use them to access the internet. I would imagine Chinese citizens would use something like a combination of WireGuard with obfuscation like stunnel, cloaking, domain fronting-like setups, and proxy chains.
Read my comment again, it has the answer. Most VPN services do not provide end-to-end tunnelling. If the exit node is located outside Russia, then what enters the Russian internet will be simple HTTPS traffic.
Ok, I’m curious as to the DPI claims. Fortunately, AmneziaWG describes how it differs from WG here: docs.amnezia.org/documentation/amnezia-wg/
In brief, the packet format of conventional WireGuard is retained but randomized shifts and decoy data is added, to avail the packets with the appearance of either an unknown protocol or of well-established chatty protocols (eg QUIC, SIP). That is indeed clever, and their claims seem to be narrow and accurate: for a rule-based DPI system, no general rule can be written to target a protocol that shape-shifts its headers like this.
However, it remains possible that an advanced form of statistical analysis or MiTM-based inspection can discover the likely presence of Amnezia-obfuscated WireGuard packets, even if still undecryptable. This stems from the fact that the obfuscation is still bounded to certain limits, such as adding no more than 64 Bytes to plain WireGuard init packets. That said, to do so would require some large timescales to gather statistically-meaningful data, and is not the sort of thing which a larger ISP can implement at scale. Instead, this type of vulnerability would be against particularized targets, to determine if covert communications is happening, rather than decrypting the contents of said communication.
For the sysadmins following along, the threat of data exfiltration is addressed as normal: prohibit unknown outbound ports or suspicious outbound destinations. You are filtering outbound traffic, right?
As someone living in Russia, it indeed works to trick complex DPI systems. Unlike classic Wireguard, it works.
Alternatively, you can download Amnezia VPN client app on your phone or PC, and it has this amazing function where you provide the IP and root credentials, and it installs server software automatically.
Obviously, only use it when you don’t have other things running on your server.
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I’ve seen in this thread:
5 acronyms in this thread; the most compressed thread commented on today has 7 acronyms.
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